By Simone Capuozzo
On July 1st, Euractiv published an interview with Renew Europe’s MEP Billy Kelleher in which he argued that her country should consider scrapping veto rights at EU level during its turn at the Council Presidency. She called for more efficient action in an enlarged Union, as multiple countries are negotiating their accession: European Council President Antonio Costa has confirmed the EU is drafting Montenegro’s Accession Treaty, to be signed in 2028. Moreover, Moldova and Ukraine have unlocked four new accession clusters. Kelleher claimed unanimity to be an obsolete and counterproductive system, as seen with Orban’s frequent obstructions of EU foreign policy.
The EU’s enlargement strategy
The last time the EU welcomed a new member was in 2013, when Croatia joined. EU enlargement has significantly slowed down after its ‘boom’ in 2004 and 2007, when twelve countries, among which veto-hungry Hungary and Slovakia, entered the club. What followed was a stage of enlargement ‘fatigue’, with negotiations with Serbia and Turkiye stalling. However, especially after 2022, the Union has shifted to challenging Russia’s influence in the common neighbourhood. Welcoming the official opening of negotiation clusters with Ukraine and Moldova on June 12th, Council President Antonio Costa and Commission President von der Leyen defined enlargement as a “strategic choice” for the EU, aimed at ensuring peace and prosperity by welcoming new Member States. This was reiterated in the 2026 State of the Union address on September 16th, in which Von der Leyen announced the proposal of new roadmaps for the most advanced candidates, as well as the tying of new partnerships (among which Canada’s ‘associated membership’) across the world to protect the rules-based international order.
The Risk of a Trojan Horse
However, enlargement without reform may at best not happen, and at worst paralyse the EU even further. Kelleher’s suggestion comes from what is commonly seen as the Union’s weakness: the ability of one to stop the will of 26. His mentioning of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is not random, as, under his tenure, Hungary has exercised its veto rights a staggering 21 times. In particular, Budapest has long been a fervent opponent of Ukrainian membership. Notably, Orban has long opposed funding to Ukraine and the adoption of sanctions against Russia, while the veto on Ukrainian membership has only recently been lifted by the new Prime Minister Peter Magyar. Despite Orban’s demise, Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico remains closely tied to Putin.
Possible Loopholes
While von der Leyen has urged for reform, calling it “indispensable” in light of enlargement, the EU has a few aces up its sleeve that do not require changing the Treaties. More specifically, the Union may change the game by using the ‘passerelle clause’, and ‘constructive abstention’. The former allows decisions regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to be approved through qualified majority voting, if the procedure is approved unanimously. While a parliamentary committee has hypothesised its application in adopting sanctions, statements on human rights issues, and the protection of civilians, the clause has never been activated. The latter allows opposers to leave the negotiation room to let those in favour approve decisions in their absence, as happened with Orban’s ‘coffee break’ in 2023, which allowed the EU to start Ukraine’s membership process.
The Need for Reform
Despite being a talking point for years, the issue of ending the unanimity requirement remains contentious. Despite Orban’s demise, Magyar has delayed the opening of Ukraine and Moldova’s accession clusters citing concerns over wording, and Fico still remains in power. Former Council President Charles Michel has warned how some leaders hid behind Orban to hide their dissent. France and Germany had written a joint report calling for reform, while Italy was adamant in protecting national sovereignty. While all these countries’ foreign policies are shaped by their membership in both the EU and NATO, an even bigger obstacle is represented by four neutral Member States: Austria, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta.
Austria is historically cautious on immigration and constitutionally neutral: Vienna has blocked Romania and Bulgaria’ admission in the Schengen area until 2024 as well as delayed sanctions against Russia in 2025. In Ireland’s case, Lynn Boylan, Ireland’s only MEP on the Security and Defence Committee, argued that abolishing unanimity would subjugate smaller Member States (such as Malta and Cyprus) to the will of bigger countries in an increasingly militarised EU. In search for a compromise in May, the Commission controversially proposed granting new members veto rights years after their admission, in light of Chinese and Russian influence in the Western Balkans. Amongst this uncertainty, the Union is at a crossroads: protect national sovereignty in foreign policy and paralyse itself, or approve reforms and create an unrepairable rift among its Member States.
About the author
Simone holds a bachelor’s and a master’s in European Studies from Maastricht University. His main interests are the geopolitical implications of the green transition, freedom of expression, and the future of EU enlargement.