By Tamta Pantsulaia
The three countries in the South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – seem to be undergoing significant changes, as events in this region have evolved quite dynamically over the past decade. Regional and external powers, particularly Russia, Turkey and China pose a significant impediment to the political coherence of the South Caucasus countries. Their actions in the region often influence these nations’ political trajectories.
In such a tense geopolitical context, it may be interesting to observe the changes, expectations, and foreign policy directions that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are pursuing.
Armenia’s Westward Turn: A Break from Russian Influence?
Armenia has emerged as a notable instance of a Western-oriented strategy in the South Caucasus region, particularly in recent years. In contrast, this shift highlights the complex Georgian political reality, where the current government is distancing itself from Europe and the West, preferring a relatively neutral policy.
The last decade in Armenia has been marked by significant transformation. Between 2015 and 2017, Armenia adopted a rather neutral stance, aiming to balance the regional powers in Europe and the South Caucasus. During the presidency of Serzh Sargsyan, even though Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EES), the government maintained its ties with the European Union, as evidenced by the signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017.
Nonetheless, Russian influence on Armenian politics remained strong, along with a significant dependence on Russia for energy and security. Additionally, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demonstrated Russia’s ambitions for regional dominance. Its role as a negotiator, particularly after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, indicated that maintaining a frozen conflict was more beneficial for Russia in terms of preserving its influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, rather than resolving the issue.
The emergence of Nikol Pashinyan in Armenian politics in 2018 brought notable openness to the West. This change was partly driven by Armenia’s disappointment during the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, when Russia failed to adequately protect its interests, resulting in a weakened trust in Russia.
Russia’s shifting focus towards the war in Ukraine and Armenia’s exploration of alternative partnerships and reconsideration of its dependency on Moscow is rather problematic to Russia. Armenia’s geopolitical course has taken a fascinating turn. The current agenda incorporates strengthening ties with the European Union and the United States, as demonstrated by the signing of the Charter on Strategic Partnership with the United States. While this gradual departure from Russia’s sphere of influence is unwelcomed in Moscow, it reflects a pragmatic strategy by Armenia to address the uncertainties of its traditional alliances.
From Euro-Atlantic Aspirations to Authoritarian Tendencies in Georgia
Such a Western shift does not concern Georgia, once one of the first countries in the region to demonstrate its willingness to join the Euro-Atlantic community. Over the past decade, Georgia made significant progress, notably by signing the Association Agreement with the European Union in 2014. Additionally, being granted the right to travel visa-free to the Schengen Area also served as a symbolic gesture, reflecting the country’s commitment to deepening its ties with the EU and pursuing European integration.
However, the country’s Western alignment has been threatened by the ruling regime’s authoritarian tendencies and policies reminiscent of its northern neighbour. A clear example of this is the intense political polarization that arose from the 2020 parliamentary elections, along with the gradual shift in geopolitical ambitions, particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, the primary objective of the Georgian Dream party has been to propagate the Russian narrative that Georgia may be the next target after Ukraine. The disinformation campaign launched after 2022, aimed at undermining the image of the West and the European Union, significantly influences certain segments of the population.
In the aftermath of the October 2024 elections, there has been a rise in intimidation tactics resembling those used by Russia: the suppression of peaceful protests, the persecution and torture of opposition figures, and the dissemination of derogatory messages against representatives of the European Union and its institutions. These actions directly reflect a metamorphosis of the country’s political trajectory by the Georgian Dream party.
Furthermore, the party’s course is progressively shifting towards the East. The establishment a of strategic partnership between Georgia and China, China’s involvement in strategically important infrastructure projects in Georgia, and the attendance of the Georgian Dream’s Prime Minister at the inauguration of the Iranian President raise questions about the alignment of Georgian Dream’s priorities with those of the country and its population.
Once a pioneer in pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia is now, due to deteriorating relations with the West, adopting a neutral stance. This significantly undermines the progress that was made during the country’s earlier pro-European phase. The single obvious indication that Georgia has not yet descended into complete authoritarianism is the unwavering protests by the Georgian people, which currently serve as the most legitimate measure of the country’s pro-European geopolitical orientation.
Azerbaijan’s Regional Agenda: Strategic Neutrality and Domestic Authoritarianism
Unlike the constantly changing positions of the Armenian and Georgian governments, Azerbaijan’s Western policy has been relatively neutral. Maintaining ties with Russia and the West without establishing preferential relations with either further demonstrates its regional ambitions. Despite Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the European Union on energy and trade, President Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy shows no signs of fostering closer ties with the West or implementing democratic reforms. Such reforms would pose a direct threat to his authoritarian regime and undermine his desire for regional dominance.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan regards Turkey as a key strategic partner and aims for a balanced foreign policy that considers both Russian and Western influences. With Turkey’s support, Azerbaijan gained an advantage in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war against Armenia, which not only solidified its regional position but also bolstered the Ilham Aliyev regime domestically, enhancing national pride in the process.
The main priority for the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan is to maintain internal control and consolidate the situation achieved by President Aliyev. This involves maximum suppression of any potential protests, fostering nationalistic sentiments among the population through an ambitious foreign geopolitical policy, and positioning Azerbaijan as a key regional player. Any efforts that might challenge this – such as deeper integration with the West or adherence to democratic standards – do not align with the regime’s model of governance.
Looking ahead: Strategic Engagement in the Shifting South Caucasus
The political landscape in the South Caucasus has undergone significant changes over the past decade. Armenia and Georgia have shifted their roles in the region and are prioritizing different alliances. While Georgia was once seen as a pro-European country with a clearly defined Euro-Atlantic direction, it has now taken a step back under the Georgian Dream government. In contrast, Armenia has emerged as a more proactive player, seeking to strengthen its ties with the European Union despite heightened tensions with Moscow. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan asserts its regional ambitions, as although it maintains a partnership with the European Union, it does not demonstrate a desire to establish closer ties with the West.
The South Caucasus region holds significant importance for the European Union primarily due to its strategic location, which serves as a corridor to Central Asia, offering vast energy resources and trade opportunities. Additionally, the region acts as a stage for global powers that can influence major geopolitical changes. Europe also plays a great role in this area, particularly concerning Georgia and Armenia, given their traditional pro-European stance. Europe should seize the opportunity to effectively counter the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the region and, simultaneously, reinforce the position as a stable power and a leading partner in the South Caucasus.
About the author
Tamta is a master’s graduate from Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science, specialising in Eastern European and Russian affairs. Her research also covers EU Enlargement and the Eastern Partnership Policy, with a particular interest in the South Caucasus region. Originally from Georgia, she examines the region’s geopolitical dynamics and its evolving relationship with both the European Union and its neighboring powers.
European Studies Review 