By Aemi Desideri
Introduction
On 5 March 2024, the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) presented the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), a landmark initiative aimed at bolstering defence capabilities at the EU level. This strategy, designed to be “responsive” and “resilient” to the current challenges in the global geopolitical landscape, aligns with the European Council’s directives outlined in the Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. It emphasizes the importance of long-term “readiness” and “competitiveness” in the face of evolving security threats faced by the European Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
What exactly does EU defence readiness mean? – more, better, together
As articulated in the EDIS, it refers to the “steady state of preparedness” of both the Union and its Member States to safeguard the security of their citizens, defend territorial integrity, and uphold their fundamental democratic values. This encompasses the capability to offer military assistance to partners such as Ukraine. Moreover – although mentions of the cybersecurity domain and the link to NATO are also deemed essential within the framework – the urgency of EDIS is particularly underscored by recent events, notably the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In this regard, as raised by HR/VP Josep Borrell, available stocks have been depleted after two years of intense war, shifting “from a war of stocks to a war of production.” The imperative for Europe to fortify its defence capabilities and contribute to Ukraine’s “recovery and reconstruction” was also highlighted. However, EDIS, grounded in the gap analysis developed on 18 May 2022, goes beyond immediate emergency responses, aiming for a more comprehensive, structural, and long-term approach to EU defence. This strategy represents a departure from past decades, during which Europe relied on the protective umbrella of the United States through the NATO alliance.
Characterised by essential features encapsulated in the motto “more, better, together, European” – the EU Member States require their defence industry to enhance its capability for increased and expedited production. Achieving this necessitates greater collaboration and collective efforts among Europeans as a whole.
Furthermore, to fulfil the long-term component, the first operational measure of EDIS, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), aims to enhance defence production capability. It involves injecting 1.5 billion euros from the EU budget over a three-year period (2025-2027) to jumpstart the initiative, including the possibility of windfall profits from frozen Russian assets. Nevertheless, securing adequate funding remains a challenge, and as Sophia Besch explained, “EU budgetary negotiations are notoriously difficult.” On the one hand, certain governments had precise clauses within the plan. For instance, France pushed for military investments to prioritise European companies over purchases from other countries, a practice common among many EU armies. Conversely, Greece and Cyprus sought to explicitly prohibit purchases from the Turkish military industry.
On the other hand, EU officials currently acknowledge that this funding is insufficient to meet the strategy’s “ambitious targets.” They are banking on a substantial increase in EU defence spending in the upcoming seven-year budget, which begins in 2028. Hence, only “if the funding matches the level of ambition,” as phrased by Camille Grand, EDIS could potentially lead to a more self-reliant and robust EU. Inter alia, EU Member States must ensure that a minimum of 40% of their defence equipment acquisitions are made collectively by 2030, with intra-EU defence trade accounting for at least 35% of the EU defence market’s value. This stipulation carries significant implications beyond mere statistics; it signals – and builds on what was pointed out supra – a strategic shift towards greater cooperation and interdependence within the Union.
Connecting theory with practice: EDIS and the challenge of protracted conflict
Moreover, EDIS can be interpreted not only as, generally, a response to the recent full-scale invasion of Ukraine but also, more precisely, as a proactive measure against the potential escalation of the conflicts into what Edward Azar termed “protracted conflict.” Such conflicts can persist for generations and are identity-based, as seen in the cases of Palestine/Israel and the internal conflict within Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek parts. Will the war in Ukraine fit Azar’s theory? The EU seems to anticipate it will and, therefore, is getting ready with a comprehensive, long-term industrial defence strategy until 2027. Is this a mere coincidence, or does it signal something more fundamental? The acknowledgment of a necessity for the EU to “become more self-reliant” in the defence realm has escalated following remarks made by Donald Trump. Trump suggested the possibility that the U.S. could ignore NATO’s Article 5 collective defence provision and withhold protection from NATO allies who do not meet adequate defence spending levels, particularly in the face of a potential Russian invasion. Hence, some analysts have also pictured a preventive approach concerning the upcoming elections in the United States and the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency.
Lastly, another factor that must be considered is the role of emerging technologies in the current Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While some analysts may view it through the lens of traditional warfare – the so-called concept of “old war” elaborated by Mary Kaldor – the use of emerging technologies, such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cannot be overlooked. EDIS is built in alignment with this perspective. As highlighted in the Berlin Memorandum, developed by the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, UAS not only offer governments and private sectors valuable tools for emergency responses, firefighting, and agriculture, but they are also a double-edged sword in terms of risks and benefits as potential instruments used in war. Although the war in Ukraine is not “the first drone war”, the employment of drones (like the widely use “Leleka-100”) in Ukraine represents a “step change,” as emphasised by Ulrike Franke.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the European Defence Industrial Strategy emerges as a pivotal response to contemporary security challenges, notably underscored by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By emphasising collaboration, innovation, and self-resilience, EDIS paved the way towards bolstering EU defence capabilities and promoting better cohesion among EU Member States. Nonetheless, obstacles and geopolitical uncertainties loom large, demanding a preventive strategy. After all, as HR/VP Borrell said, “We need to become defence ready.” Moving forward, EU leaders must specifically prioritise the allocation of resources in the defence industrial landscape, navigate complex budgetary negotiations, and remain vigilant in the face of evolving and asymmetrical threats. EDIS represents not only a blueprint for enhancing European defence readiness but also a testament to and a legacy for the Union’s commitment to safeguarding investments and adaptability. It ensures effective implementation and long-term success in a world marked by the persistent spectre of conflict and the dynamic intersectionality between traditional and emerging warfare paradigms.
About the Author
Aemi Desideri is a research trainee at the T.M.C. Asser Institute in the Netherlands, focusing on projects concerning violent extremism, maritime security, border security management, and terrorism. She is also a research assistant within the Better Evidence Project at George Mason University, analysing farmer-herder conflicts and peacebuilding efforts in West Africa, and the Mediterranean Programme Director of the Platform for Peace and Humanity. Previously, she was a consultant for the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, based in Malta. With a profound interest in security and defence issues, Aemi holds a Dual Master’s Degree in Conflict Analysis, Resolution, and Mediterranean Security from George Mason University and the University of Malta.
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