By Harry Slattery
While Europe prepares for a potential €800 billion security and defence boost via the Readiness 2030 package, Ireland remains lacking in many areas, with EU allies raising eyebrows about the island state’s pressing capability gaps. Particularly salient is Ireland’s lack of a dedicated foreign security service. In a European climate increasingly plagued by hybrid activity and murky espionage tactics, and given Ireland’s fast-approaching EU Presidency, it is time Ireland began to seriously consider the creation of a comprehensive intelligence service. The following sections consider the state of the Irish intelligence apparatus, its underlying intricacies, and what a redoubtable agency may look like.
Assessing the Necessity: Complexities and Confusion
Up to this point, intelligence gathering in Ireland has been the responsibility of the state’s police force, An Garda Síochána (AGS), together with the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). AGS addresses domestic security threats, while the IMIS deals, for the most part, with external security threats. While these roles may appear well-defined at the surface, issues have been carried forward by successive governments, which have led to some uncomfortable political turbulence. This discomfort has arisen from questions of national security and defence, consistently being placed on the back burner by Irish governments. Ireland’s policy of military neutrality has tacitly granted the state to spend a lax 0.24% of its GDP on defence.
A legacy of false security has permeated Irish political society, with the state’s intelligence apparatus largely coloured by its reactive nature. In fact, Ireland’s entire national security government structure is characterised by a certain “ad-hocery”. This attitude has engendered the creation of a quagmire of divisions, each contributing to the functioning of the state’s security apparatus – albeit still in the absence of a National Security Strategy. Myriad bodies, such as the National Security Analysis Centre, National Security Authority, the Ministerial National Security Council and National Security Secretariat, only increase the system’s complexity. Such complexities prevail at the levels of intelligence gathering and dissemination as well. Irish national security officials have stated that this ad hoc approach to intelligence in Ireland has led to confusion amongst agencies over “who is responsible for what”. Moreover, these agencies, at times, have refused to share information as a result of conflicting personalities and fear of intelligence leakages.
While AGS and IMIS are mainly defined by their internal and external roles, both agencies contribute to counter-espionage efforts, in addition to pursuing certain threats to national security. It is this overlap in responsibility and strife at the strategic and even personal level which must be urgently addressed. The complexities in the Irish national security mechanism have been further exacerbated by the lack of a coherent national security strategy.
To become a reliable partner in a European context, Ireland must also address its over-reliance on allies for actionable intelligence. Ireland possesses an acutely limited overseas intelligence capacity, which is reflected in this relationship with partner services. Irish agencies thus receive the large majority of their intelligence via cooperation with Interpol and the EU’s INTCEN. Ireland is not without an intelligence-gathering capacity; this is evident. Nonetheless, it requires a service capable of counter-balancing its distinct lack of hard power through the provision of strategic intelligence, which can more accurately inform international decision-making, in addition to the state’s preexisting “current” and “warning” intelligence functions.
The Vision (and its challenges)
The creation of a security service under Fianna Fáil did not make it into the 2024 Programme for Government. Moreover, security questions rarely, if ever, feature during election periods as they fail to mobilise Irish voters in a party’s favour.
It is encouraging that the current government is at the very least cognisant of such national security demands. Adjacent to government efforts in reforming its approach to national security matters, Irish citizens must also make an effort to understand the dynamic security environment in Europe and now, the Middle East. Coming to terms with these geopolitical events is crucial to comprehending objectively positive shifts in Irish security policy development, such as the creation of a security agency. As a stalwart of the citizens’ assembly, Dublin has a unique opportunity to make use of this in furthering public debate around security issues, such as the one addressed here.
In reforming Irish intelligence gathering, it would not be enough to simply alter the remit of the current AGS and IMIS agencies. An entirely separate foreign agency is required, with an independent chain of command and responsibility to the government. Importantly, the agency would also be designated to its own budget. However, the transfer of intelligence and security professionals from AGS and IMIS may lead to staff shortages in both agencies. Such a move may lead to inter-agency competition vying for resources and professionals. An Irish security service would, nonetheless, benefit greatly from the highly educated population and security professionals working in cyber, corporate and academic fields.
Clear delineation of the roles of preexisting agencies would also be crucial. The Irish Defence Forces and IMIS would retain their role as keepers of military intelligence. Regarding AGS, an FBI/CIA relationship may prove most effective. AGS would retain its domestic law enforcement and powers of arrest function. A foreign security service, on the other hand, would be responsible for running intelligence agents and surveillance operations abroad, feeding Irish political decision-making. Notably, IMIS has taken part in extensive operations running agents in the likes of Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Indeed, it appears IMIS has the capacity to engage in extensive espionage-style activities, according to one senior intelligence officer. Furthermore, the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice operate an information gathering function which informs security policy making. Any potential limitations in this area would presumably manifest as a financial, time-consuming burden, while individuals are trained in spycraft and foreign intelligence tactics. With political will comes the political bill. In this sense, Dublin must be willing to commit the capital necessary to allow for the agency’s fruition and covert high-level function.
The creation of a foreign security agency would ultimately create a singular touchpoint for allied security services via which information could pass back and forth, potentially mitigating the fears of personality clashes and leaks. AGS would continue to operate via multilateral policing networks and IMIS with its military partners. Ireland’s European allies would greatly benefit from a reformed security actor. Increased Irish contributions to the European security conversation via one streamlined security service – with pronounced delineations between its domestic intelligence partners – would reflect well in Brussels as Ireland seeks to strip itself of the label of Europe’s feckless, freeloading security link.
Conclusion
The current European climate and deeper systemic issues in Ireland’s security apparatus need to be addressed. Considering the creation of an Irish foreign security service should not come across as radical, neither to policymakers nor the Irish layperson. A standalone service to complement domestic law enforcement, and military intelligence, is what is being advocated for here. This would represent a welcome addition to the Irish security apparatus, increasing Dublin’s ability to conduct covert overseas intelligence-gathering missions and liaise with allies. Like contentious issues in Irish society before, citizens’ assemblies have proven beneficial to espousing concerns and garnering a deeper sense of understanding and appreciation for the government’s decision-making process. This could certainly prove advantageous.
The long-awaited National Security Strategy must pay heed to the grievances expressed by European allies. A commitment from the Irish government to the creation of a foreign security service may go some way in alleviating the concerns of European partners, who see Ireland as a weak link. A forward-looking vision of an Irish intelligence agency is the first step in a list of items long overdue for consideration in Dublin. While undoubtedly presenting its own array of challenges, it would prove an invaluable investment for Irish national security in the long run, with its provision of information to the governmental decision-making apparatus and the state’s sense of security. The opportunity for Ireland to transform its status and relationship within a European context cannot be missed. If this small island nation is to relinquish itself from its perfidious connotations among allies, a whole-island approach is necessary, proceeding in lockstep towards greater security of Ireland and Europe.
About the author
Harry is a graduate of European Studies (BA) and International Relations (MA). His special interests lie in the areas of security, defence and foreign policy. In the past, he has worked as a translator, and wishes to pursue a career in governmental relations and diplomacy.
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