By Md. Arifur Rahman
The international nuclear landscape has entered into a turbulent era of renewed instability. With Russia’s suspension of the NEW START Treaty participation, the U.S. announcement of resuming nuclear testing, the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear weapon tests, and intense friction between nuclear-armed states, it is certain that global arms control faces the most uncertain moment since the end of the Cold War. While nuclear disarmament is still a stated goal for many governments, its feasibility is shrinking due to the absence of trust. The European Union (EU) has pushed the agenda by advocating for nuclear disarmament verification as a practical pathway to rebuild confidence and unlock a diplomatic channel that has been strategically paralysed.
The EU’s roots as a patron of multilateral global governance inform its advocacy for nuclear disarmament verification. The EU positions itself as a key bridge between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This commitment has become more visible over the years. The EU has been a key donor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has supported projects aligned with improving nuclear monitoring systems, nuclear safeguards for the civilian material, and training and confidence-building measures. However, the global trend —particularly since the Russia-Ukraine war— has caused trust erosion between major powers and made high-level disarmament agreements highly difficult to negotiate.
The EU has found the practical entry points that can keep disarmament on the table despite major treaties, and verification has emerged as the most realistic pathway to push the agenda. The nuclear disarmament verification focuses specifically on proof: how to ensure that nuclear weapons are eliminated from the arsenal, dismantled, or stored in ways that confirm irreversibility. It includes technologies such as environmental sampling, data chain-of-custody systems, radiation measurement, and on-site physical inspection protocols, but also relies on diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and shared farmwork for the monitoring. For the EU, nuclear disarmament verification serves two major interconnected strategic goals.
First, Europe is the home of multiple nuclear states, and several NATO members host part of the U.S’s. nuclear arsenal as part of the alliance’s nuclear sharing. Since the Russia-Ukraine war, the tensions regarding nuclear weapons deployment has risen to an unprecedented high. As the war on the continent and nuclear signaling rise, Europe has a direct interest in preventing nuclear escalation and misunderstanding. Verification helps to lower those tensions.
Second, the EU lacks the hard military power of the U.S., Russia, or China, so its advantages rely on the regulatory, technical, and normative power to exert influence. The traditional arms control leaders, such as the U.S., are increasingly unreliable, withdrawing from key treaties (INF, ABM, Open Skies). Russia is not in favour of the current arms control architecture, where China is not engaged in bilateral disarmament talks. The EU fills this leadership, diplomatic and technical void by positioning itself as a key custodian of the global nuclear order, exercising its normative power and asserting a “strategic autonomy” posture. This strategy is incremental but deliberate: build the tools first, then rebuild the confidence and trust that is required for future political agreements.
Challenge 1: Conflict of Political Interest Among Member States:
The EU is not monolithic, despite the rhetorical unity on the arms control issue. Some of the member states, such as Austria and Ireland, strongly call for nuclear disarmament; others participate in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, hosting U.S. B61 bombs as part of the Alliance’s deterrence posture. This creates diverging political incentives. Countries that depend on a nuclear deterrence framework are cautious, as any disarmament initiative could jeopardize NATO and the host country’s strategic position. On the contrary, non-nuclear states often support a concerted timeline for disarmament.
This puts the EU in a careful position to avoid being considered as hindering NATO’s nuclear strategy, even as it promotes the transparency and elimination of the nuclear arsenal. Balancing this position needs skill and careful diplomatic gesture, underlining verification as a security-increasing measure rather than a disarmament demand.
Challenge 2: Technical & Security Complexities
Verification is a complex process that involves e.g., the exchange of highly sensitive data extracted from the current nuclear stockpiles, warhead design, and storage system. States perceive this with concern about exposing the information that can compromise national security, reveal classified technical details, and give the upper hand to the adversaries over weapon capabilities.
The legitimate and universally accepted verification methods that confirm disarmament are scientifically and diplomatically challenging. There are some initiatives, such as the “information-barrier technologies” and tamper-proof monitoring systems, that are ongoing experiments —however, they are not universally accepted yet. The EU’s work in this domain is incremental: showing that verification can protect security while providing transparency.
Challenge 3: Limited Leverage over Nuclear-Armed States
The EU’s role is naturally constrained, as there is only one EU country that possesses nuclear weapons following Brexit. Despite France’s nuclear transparency signaling a desire for dialogue on extending strategic governance, it closely guards control over its atomic doctrine.
In the meantime, cooperation with other nuclear-armed states —the U.S., Russia, China, and others— relies on broader geopolitical dynamics over which the EU has little influence. Here, the EU can take the leadership role of nuclear disarmament verification norms, a research platform, and also a diplomatic framework. Progress ultimately requires willingness from nuclear states to engage. The EU’s role is catalytic, however, not decisive.
Conclusion
Despite these challenges, the EU can position itself as a technical and diplomatic leader in nuclear governance, filling the gap left by the fragile arms control agreements and security structure. The EU’s nuclear disarmament verification agenda is also signaling a broader, significant evolution in the European security landscape and strategy.
Rather than putting effort into competing with great powers militarily, the EU is projecting influence over normative and institutional architecture that influences global security. Verification is an area where diplomacy, politics, science, government interests, making the EU’s strengths are more visible.
Verification doesn’t end the mistrust. However, it sets the stage for cooperation and increases the feasibility of mutual assistance. Currently, when we are close to the risk of nuclear catastrophe and international security is highly fragile, that perhaps is one of the most valuable contributions the EU can make.
About the author
Md. Arifur Rahman is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the East China Normal University in Shanghai, focusing on nuclear verification and emerging technologies in arms control.
European Studies Review 