By Bella Popescu
Since January, the White House has undergone a whiplash pivot towards Russia in the Ukraine war–while the US won’t leave the Alliance, it also won’t come to the rescue of any European nation involved in a peacekeeping force should it be attacked by Russia. This blunder signalled the administration’s disregard for joint-assured defence, nearly rendering NATO’s Article 5 moot.
The phenomenon is nothing new. US’ geostrategic commitment in Europe waxed and waned under previous administrations–both under Trump’s first term and Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia”. However, with Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s alarming declarations on Ukraine’s new “strategic realities”, Europe must finally face the old elephant in the room– Common Defence.
Indeed, the discussion about strengthening European defence began well before Trump’s first presidency, with strategic autonomy being a long-standing priority for French President Emmanuel Macron, who repeatedly called for Europe to shore up its capabilities and act more independently from the United States. In 2022, his office affirmed that he was still open to “Europeanising” France’s nuclear deterrent, suggesting the presidency was willing to extend France’s nuclear umbrella to its European partners.
It was more surprising to hear Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, hailing from a strong transatlanticist party, say that Europe must work as quickly as possible to “achieve independence from the US.” With the re-grouping of Europe’s defence musketeers—the UK and France—and Germany’s approval of historical budget reform for military spending, it appears that European powers are finally signalling an amped interest in taking up the common defence responsibility.
ReArm Europe: the EU’s path to strategic autonomy
With the US acting as NATO’s phantom limb, it is no wonder that the European Commission unveiled the “ReArm Europe Plan” in March 2025. The subsequent White Paper— “Readiness 2030”—builds upon the Plan’s geopolitical outlook, budgetary proposals and underlines the bloc’s security strategy to pivot away from US defence guarantees. The joint analysis positions the threat of Russian aggression at the forefront of European security concerns, with NATO intelligence estimating that Russia could be capable of launching an attack on Europe in three to five years. The White Paper still stresses that NATO should remain the organisation through which collective defence is conducted in Europe. However, the EU’s efforts should be directed towards strengthening the Member States’ joint standing in the alliance, strengthening capabilities across seven domains. Public procurement in these areas should follow a set of rules, including seeking an EU-based solution and negotiating with European suppliers to reduce prices and lead times.
While ReArm Europe suggests that the European powers are finally ready to discuss strategic autonomy, there are some obstacles that could substantially derail the implementation of this plan.
Obstacle 1- Whose money? Joint borrowing for joint procurement
One of Readiness 2030’s financing venues could come from a joint borrowing scheme of up to €150 billion, referred to as SAFE. This initiative is deemed particularly controversial due to its reliance on Eurobonds–or what is commonly referred to as European Debt. Herein, the Commission would borrow that money in capital markets, then loan it to Member States under the condition that they jointly finance weapons in Europe. Some of the joint-procurement grouping conditions could involve a minimum of either three EU countries or two EU countries plus Ukraine or Norway. The money going to EU-made products needs to have a minimum of 65% component production developed within the bloc.
The main argument against the measure encompasses scepticism over mutualised debt repayment. This is particularly the case for those usually deemed the “Frugal Four” (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden). These countries share the concern that collective borrowing shifts financial responsibility from lower-credit-rated nations to stronger economies. Thus, they see Eurobonds, which create shared liability, as a way of guaranteeing debt for countries with weaker financial credibility. Considering that defence spending will be a long-term burden-sharing, discussions will arise over some states benefiting more from procurement while contributing disproportionately less to funding. As such, it comes as no surprise that Member States have quickly created disparate groups over how to approach the question of defence borrowing better.
Obstacle 2- How far away from the US?
A second challenge arises from the unresolved question of how much Europe can separate itself from its shared defence infrastructure with the US. Until now, the plan lacked a clear-cut method of how to assess dependencies on US defence software. For example, a known issue is that key data points from American weapon systems are automatically sent to the US, with crucial software updates and maintenance dependent on US manufacturers. Europe also relies on US approval for the use of its capabilities. This has been oversimplified in the media, reduced to discussions about whether the US is able to flick a ‘kill switch’ and disable American-made systems in Europe – however, the issue raises important questions.
An example would be the 5th generation of F-35 fighter jets. These weapons rely on the US defence company Lockheed Martin for software updates and are designed to be used alongside US-manufactured capabilities. Since the start of Russia’s war, the EU invested heavily into procurement of F-35s to aid Ukraine. Adapting the aircraft to rely on European software is not realistic in the short term, leading to serious questions about these massive procurement commitments by the EU.
Likewise, it is unclear whether the common European deterrent will include an autonomous nuclear component. US warheads, or B61 gravity bombs, are kept in underground vaults in main military facilities – Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey—and can only be used with “permissive action link” codes under American leadership. Currently, only two European countries have nuclear weapons of their own. Britain’s are assigned to NATO, and experts question whether its program could even survive without the US support, while France is the only EU country that has a fully independent deterrent.
Obstacle 3- How fast can the EU develop a joint command?
Finally, it is worth considering whether the EU has the command structure in place to pull a joint conventional and/or nuclear deterrent. Most EU national militaries coordinate through NATO, particularly NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) or NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). As the EU does not possess a centralised command structure of its own, European governments have historically relied on these bodies, wherein command positions were always held by US generals or admirals.
While recent discussions have drifted towards the strengthening of the Permanent European Structured Cooperation policy (PESCO), it is important to underline that the programme is a framework for capability development (joint arms production, procurement, intel-sharing and logistics), and not an operational command-and-control with a centralised authority.Unfortunately, Europe lacks both the hierarchical framework and binding guarantee–NATO’s Article 5–that would enable national leaders to implement a unified defence strategy.
To conclude, creating a Common European Defence force requires more than aligning financing, production and procurement of joint capabilities. Common doctrine, interoperability (standardised communications, intel-sharing, infrastructure for rapid mobilisation, etc.) and an overall command and control system are necessary to mould the various national militaries into a unified force. Although a complete short-term defence decoupling from the US is unrealistic, the bloc must move past its initial shock and make the most of its existing resources—a process that, finally, and hopefully not too late, is underway.
About the author
Bella Popescu graduated from the University of Cambridge with a degree in Multi-disciplinary Gender Studies, having previously completed a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at King’s College London, War Studies Department. Her research specialisation combines the study of authoritarian regimes, democratic backsliding, and feminist-oriented public policy.
European Studies Review 