By Viktoriia Skoropadska
The energy dependence on gas supplies from the Russian Federation played a cruel joke on the European Union after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At that time, it served as shock therapy for many EU countries, whose task over the next two years was to reorient themselves to other markets in terms of energy cooperation. For almost three years of war, Kyiv continued to transit Russian gas to EU countries to allow European partners enough time to look for alternative suppliers before the gas transit agreement between Ukraine and Russia expires on January 1.
Overall, the energy supply diversification efforts of the EU have been quite successful, with Gazprom’s share in the structure of European gas imports dropping sharply from 40% in 2021 to 8% in 2023. Meanwhile, Moscow lost its largest energy export market and, in addition to that, was deprived of its influential bargaining chip, which had always played a decisive role in Russia’s political games.
However, for some EU countries, the search for alternative energy suppliers proved to be too politically sensitive, as it implied a rupture of the long-term friendship with Russia. Thus, Slovakia continues to reaffirm its loyalty to Moscow by again and again blocking military aid to Ukraine, enjoying reduced gas prices for Russian LNG (liquefied natural gas) in return.
Despite Bratislava’s expectations, Kyiv has clearly stated that the agreement on Russian gas transit will not be continued after its official expiration on January 1. In response, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened to halt emergency electricity supplies to Ukraine during periods of energy shortages– the emergency supplies that provide critical support for Ukraine’s power grid amidst sustained Russian attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure.
At the moment, Slovakia is the second-ranking country in terms of its ability to ensure energy supply to Ukrainian power plants during periods of electricity deficit. It can hardly be argued that Slovakia thus has any kind of trump cards up its sleeve. Poland has already stated that it will be ready to back up Ukraine if Fico follows through with this step. In this scenario, Slovakia would be the sole party incurring losses, facing an annual energy export revenue shortfall of $200 million in the state budget. Slovakia’s economy is already undergoing relative economic difficulties due to Ukraine’s termination of Russian energy transit, and Fico’s reckless rhetoric could only lead to bigger financial strain for Bratislava.
Fico’s trip to Moscow on December 22 can barely be called a successful diplomatic visit; otherwise the Russian side would not have missed the opportunity to brag about its effective foreign policy with what is arguably the only European Union country that still maintains direct engagement with Putin. No joint statements were made and the issues addressed at the meeting remained behind the scenes. On the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy believes this stealth to be an indicator of the fear of public reaction to the topics discussed in the Kremlin.
The scale of Fico’s victimhood rhetoric is disproportionate to the actual consequences of Ukraine’s decision to stop transit of Russian gas. According to the European Commission’s statement, effective preparedness measures launched long before the expiration of the Russia-Ukraine transit agreement prevented the emergence of a critical situation in the European energy sector. Thus, the EU was able to meet its gas demand through alternative supply routes, as well as through increased storage capabilities as compared to 2022.
In addition, a study by the International Energy Agency on the Slovak Republic’s energy system illustrated that even before the war in Ukraine started, Slovakia had already been working on developing new infrastructure to secure gas supply in the event of a disruption in the existing system. In addition, SPP, the country’s largest gas supplier, has signed deals with several alternative exporters, which are projected to cover 70% of gas demand in Slovakia. The report states that the newly established Poland-Slovakia Gas Interconnection is capable of 4.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year in transmission capacity to Slovakia, whereas the annual gas demand of the country slightly exceeds 4 bcm– considerably lower as compared to the figure of 5 bcm recorded in 2022. Besides, Slovakia has secured contracts for Norwegian and LNG-sourced gas. Due to the active engagement with the Projects of Common Interest (PCI) program launched by the European Commission in 2013, Slovakia has achieved complete interconnection with neighboring countries, increasing its energy supply diversification. Another indicator of Slovakia’s far-reaching energy policy is the negotiations led by Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok with Qatar regarding potential LNG deliveries from the Persian Gulf.
However, Fico’s overheated rhetoric on gas transit continues as he threatens to block all European aid for Ukraine amidst critical times for Kyiv. Since Donald Trump assumed the US presidency, his well-established reputation for a highly pragmatic approach to this war was manifested in freezing all US foreign aid for 90 days. This could offer the EU a chance to take proactive leadership in the matter. The potential blocking of subsequent EU aid packages could present a challenge for Kyiv in maintaining the functionality of its civilian infrastructure and adequacy of the humanitarian situation. Recently, Zelenskyy commented on Fico’s position, emphasizing that “for American LNG you have to pay with money, but for Russian gas you have to pay not only with money, but also with independence and sovereignty”.
It is not obvious what price Fico is paying for his friendship with Putin, but it is clear that it has already cost him legitimacy and his party’s stability in the government. The opposition parties Progressive Slovakia, Freedom and Solidarity, and the Christian Democrats have again submitted a motion of no confidence in Robert Fico’s government, and on January 3, a large-scale protest against Fico’s foreign policy and his pro-Russian narrative erupted in Bratislava.
The political crisis in Slovakia has only been exacerbated by Fico’s rhetoric around the Russian gas transit deal. There is a growing consensus that Fico’s government will not reach the end of its term in 2027 and could collapse as early as 2025. Public protests in Bratislava, a joint statement of 264 psychiatrists and psychologists questioning the adequacy of Fico’s political behavior, and several members of parliament leaving the coalition recently make it highly doubtful whether it will retain a majority at February’s parliamentary session.
About the Author
Viktoriia is a final-year Master’s student in European Studies at the University of Regensburg, specializing in international security, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation. In addition to her studies, she volunteers as a Research Analyst at Foreign Brief, where she conducts open-source analysis on critical geopolitical trends. Viktoriia’s current research interest focuses on the future of arms control diplomacy between Iran and the European Union, as well as the evolving security architecture in the Middle East. Previously Viktoriia interned at CEPA at the Transatlantic Defense and Security department. Besides, she is a scholar at the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung and a mentee at the 2024 Young Women in Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Mentorship Programme.
European Studies Review 