By Jordy Benooit
On Sunday the 20th of October, 2024, Moldovans voted to enshrine their desire for European Union membership into their country’s constitution. The aim: to prevent future governments from reversing the country’s accession process. The pro-EU side won with a razor thin majority, totalling just 50.4% of the vote. Praises and victory speeches were delivered in and to Moldova for days after. Yet, with the margin of victory being so small and balancing on just a few thousand votes, the outcome, and Moldova’s future, could have been very different.
The EU’s laissez-faire approach
Leading up to the referendum, the EU approached its support to Moldova’s pro-EU efforts as it has done with similar historical moments for European integration in other non-EU countries. In other words, the EU did basically nothing about it. When it comes to critical national campaigns affecting the EU’s future partnerships or its own cohesion, the EU usually refrains from actively involving itself in domestic political processes. Rather than directly supporting pro-European values and integration efforts, the EU allows these events to play out, dealing with the consequences after the fact. This was politically understandable in e.g. the Brexit-campaign, as this was seen as a domestic affair of a member state. Yet the geopolitical context, and the already active engagement of foreign anti-EU forces, meant that Moldova’s EU referendum was arguably a whole different matter.
In fact, the EU’s passive stance during Moldova’s referendum contrasts sharply with the level of alleged Russian influence in the No-camp. Early accusations of Russian interference, including reports of vote-buying and financial backing of the No-vote by the exiled oligarch Ilan Shor, underscored the high-stakes nature and geopolitical importance of the referendum. Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, denounced the situation as a “fraud of unprecedented scale”, claiming that ultimately 300,000 votes were purchased in an effort to undermine the pro-European result. While Russia leveraged financial resources and disinformation to sway public opinion against EU accession, the EU appeared reluctant to provide Moldova with the same level of overt support.
EU officials offered congratulations after the vote had passed, praising Moldova’s democratic choice, but ultimately missing an opportunity to provide tangible help during the campaign itself. Their current laissez-faire, or hands-off approach has real-life consequences. In Moldova’s case, the Yes-vote narrowly prevailed, but with only a few thousand votes deciding the outcome, the future of the country’s EU trajectory really was on the line. Had the Russian-backed No-vote succeeded, Moldova’s path to European integration could have been derailed. Yet, despite the stakes for the EU’s broader strategic interests, Moldova’s pro-European government was left to fight a major geopolitical battle largely on its own, as the EU’s contributions to the Yes-campaign were notably absent.
EU capacity for minimal-interventionist support
There were several ways the EU could have been more proactive in supporting Moldova’s pro-European efforts during the referendum campaign. One particular important one was outreach. Looking at regional voting differences, we see that the Moldovan government had difficulty reaching the more rural voters. These people often do not know or care enough about the EU, but almost intrinsically understand the risks associated with allowing the government to change their constitution. To address these concerns, the EU could have supported public outreach programmes, communicating the intention and scope of the constitutional change whilst emphasising the advantages of economic integration, rule of law, and security guarantees within the EU framework.
Besides providing information, the EU could have done more when it comes to countering disinformation. Moldova, like other Eastern Partnership countries, is highly vulnerable to Russian disinformation campaigns. Because the EU is already combating (online) disinformation domestically, it has built the expertise and resources to assist Moldova in their efforts. Offering technical support to strengthen Moldova’s media landscape would have armed the public against false narratives during the referendum campaign.
Other initiatives such as high-profile visits by EU leaders could have demonstrated strong political support within the EU for Moldova’s European aspirations. Publicly standing with Moldovan leaders and emphasising Moldova’s European future would have reinforced the message that the EU is invested in the country’s success. This could in turn make the Pro-EU choice feel like less of a gamble, as moving away from Russia with little guarantees from the EU could induce the fear of Moldova becoming stranded outside the Western security umbrella and susceptible to Russian retaliation, as was its Eastern neighbour Ukraine.
Arguably, the EU should not resort to direct financial support to either government institutions, civil society organisations or grassroots campaigns advocating for EU accession. The reason being simply that, although this would help to create a level playing field against similar Russian-backed efforts, this would leave the pro-EU campaign subjectively open to the same criticisms as the anti-EU side, namely foreign interference and an “unprecedented assault on democracy”. Instead, the EU should focus on providing aspiring member states with resources specifically aimed at strengthening its resilience against disinformation campaigns and external interference. By funding media literacy programs, independent journalism, and cybersecurity measures, the EU can support democratic integrity without promoting a specific pro-EU message, thus avoiding accusations of direct bias or undue influence.
Conclusions
Moldova’s referendum victory, while ultimately a success for the pro-EU camp, has demonstrated the EU’s ongoing reluctance to engage in the domestic political affairs of its strategic partners. While the EU is right to avoid heavy-handed intervention, its passive approach during such critical moments leaves room for adversaries like Russia to exploit weaknesses and sway outcomes. By taking a more proactive stance the EU could have helped Moldova secure a clearer and more decisive victory, preventing external forces from threatening the country’s European path.
My hope is that Moldova’s referendum is a reminder for EU officials that strategic partnerships require not just words of support, but timely and tangible actions. And now that the Moldovans have independently held off the pro-Russian forces from taking over, have reelected their pro-EU president Maia Sandu, and continue their journey toward EU membership, the EU should not consider this a personal win, but reflect and reconsider its own role in supporting democratic processes in its neighbourhood.
Promoting European values is easy in countries that already share them. But the people that live where these values are continuously threatened, they require more than just our hopes and prayers.
About the Author
Jordy Benooit holds a PgD in EU Policy Making from the BSoG, and a MSc in EU-Studies and BSc in Political Science from Ghent University. He has direct experience within the EU Bubble, focussing on the EU’s external policy and trade relations. He is also a proud godfather of two wonderful boys.
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