United In Diversity, Divided in Integration? The Debate of Europe’s ‘Two-Speed’ Future

By Efthimios Kounalakis

Mario Draghi’s engagement with the notion of a “two-speed Europe” during the European Union Summit on 12 February 2026 reflects a growing concern that the Union risks stagnation in strategic areas of European integration unless Member States secure the political will to pursue deeper cooperation. Differentiated integration is a widely studied concept within academic literature, referring to arrangements that provide greater flexibility to the Member States, allowing them to participate in EU policies at varying levels or speeds. Mario Draghi, as a figure strongly associated with European integration, holds a particularly noteworthy position: it signals that even highly pro-EU actors may view differentiated pathways as a potential solution, making the discussion increasingly significant for debates surrounding European unity.

The discussion becomes more relevant in the aftermath of Europe Day celebrations, which once again emphasised the Union’s long-standing commitment to ‘unity in diversity’ at a moment when debates surrounding differentiated integration appear increasingly normalised. Nevertheless, while this approach has historically enabled progress, its long-term effectiveness remains contested, raising fundamental questions as to whether differentiated integration can genuinely accelerate EU reform or instead risk deepening divisions within the Union.

When Integration Challenges Unity: Falling into a Vicious Circle

A considerable body of academic literature and policy discourse presents differentiated integration as a necessary mechanism for advancing European integration within an increasingly heterogeneous Union. Nevertheless, a paradox remains: If European leaders support further integration and commitment to unity, why do they simultaneously endorse concepts in which certain Member States progress faster while others risk falling behind?

The answer to this paradox appears rooted in the Union’s institutional nature. The European Union, with its unique and multi-level governance structure, frequently generates institutional constraints that hinder ambitious integration projects. Its complexity often leads promising initiatives into political deadlock, producing what scholars such as Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen describe as strategies designed to bypass institutional constraints rather than resolve them. This practice may therefore be conceptualised as an ‘integration–unity paradox,’ whereby mechanisms designed to facilitate progress risk undermining the collective cohesion upon which European integration is grounded.

To make matters more complicated, this dynamic may itself create a vicious institutional cycle. Overcoming these structural barriers would likely require substantive constitutional reform, most notably treaty change. Yet, treaty reform itself constitutes one of the EU’s greatest constraints, as the revision process requires unanimity among Member States. Consequently, within an increasingly heterogeneous Union of twenty-seven members, attempts to remove institutional barriers frequently encounter even greater political and procedural obstacles, in an era when renewed discussions surrounding further enlargement—particularly regarding Montenegro’s accession process—increasingly intensify pressure for institutional and treaty reform, especially as a larger Union may render unanimity and existing decision-making structures even more difficult to sustain.

A Trapped Reform: Flexibility to the Test

Therefore, the call for a “two-speed Europe” may be understood as an attempt to reconcile ambitious EU objectives with institutional limitations. Nevertheless, historical experience has raised a relevant question: does such flexibility produce meaningful integration or merely postpone deeper reform? The Eurozone provides perhaps the clearest example. While willing Member States advanced monetary integration, it also concentrated economic and political influence among stronger states, exposing deep divisions during the Eurozone crisis. Similar tensions emerged within the Schengen Area during the 2015 migration crisis and remain visible in Permanent Structured Cooperation, where defence cooperation continues to operate through fragmented intergovernmental arrangements. Regrettably, these examples suggest that differentiated integration may facilitate technical progress without necessarily producing long-term political cohesion.

Unity, Legitimacy, and the Cost of Flexibility

Beyond its practical advantages, differentiated integration raises crucial concerns regarding the Union’s cohesion and democratic legitimacy. Although differentiated integration has repeatedly enabled progress during periods of crisis, it also risks producing a multi-layered Union characterised by unequal participation and asymmetric political influence. As widely noted within academic literature, differentiation may facilitate short-term integration while gradually entrenching divisions between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ Member States, potentially weakening solidarity and shared political identity. However, while differentiated integration may bypass political deadlock, it rarely resolves the deeper rigidities embedded within the Union’s institutional framework. As a result, institutional complexity is therefore only managed rather than fundamentally overcome.

At the same time, differentiated integration raises a broader dilemma concerning the identity and constitutional ethos of the Union. When high-level EU officials such as Roberta Metsola publicly endorse the prospect of a “two-speed Europe,” such discourse may unintentionally challenge the Union’s narrative of unity and collective progress. Although differentiated integration does not formally exclude Member States, it may still create political inequalities, particularly when decisions taken by a limited group generate wider consequences for the Union as a whole. This raises further questions regarding whether a cohesive European political identity, or genuinely common foreign and defence policies, can fully emerge if integration increasingly proceeds through selective participation.

Furthermore, recent political developments within Hungary further complicate this landscape. Although Hungary and Viktor Orbán’s long-standing obstructionism have frequently been presented as emblematic of the institutional paralysis confronting the Union, the political shift indicates that the broader problem may extend beyond a single Member State. Only time will tell whether these developments will be sufficient to reopen discussions on deeper institutional and political reform. If this does not occur however, it may suggest that Orbán’s influence was not necessarily the central obstacle to integration, but rather a convenient excuse of Member States still remaining deeply hesitant to address matters positioned at the nucleus of national sovereignty.

Renewed discussions surrounding enlargement and potential treaty reform in the context of Montenegro’s accession process emerge almost simultaneously with these political developments, something which may itself indicate a broader shift in how institutional reform is increasingly approached within the Union.

Within this framework, the role of the European Commission becomes increasingly complex. Despite unanimity being often instrumentalised by certain Member States in the shade of pursuing national interests, the simple introduction of a more flexible decision-making procedure will most likely not constitute itself a comprehensive solution. On the contrary, it might lead to new political blocks within the union, further polarisation of Member States and complicated intergovernmental negotiations. Therefore, rather than promoting accelerated differentiation as a primary pathway forward, the Commission might need to reassert its function as a unifying institutional actor capable of fostering collective compromise and long-term integration strategies.

Draghi’s Two-Speed Europe: Towards Unity or Division?

Consequently, Draghi’s position may signal something beyond tactical adaptation; it may reflect a broader recalibration of how European integration itself is increasingly conceived. The fact that a leading pro-EU actor publicly entertains differentiated pathways demonstrates that even the Union’s most integrationist voices view flexibility as politically necessary under institutional constraints. In an era marked by intensifying techno-geopolitical competition, digital transformation, defence realignment—especially with heated discussions and debate after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and enlargement pressures, the European Union faces simultaneous demands for both speed and unity. Such changes have undoubtedly transformed the European premise, impacting how the Union itself prioritises and comprehends ‘unity.’ The paradox lies precisely here: while flexibility may enable faster responses to external pressures, sustained fragmentation could undermine the very coherence, scale, and strategic autonomy that the Union seeks to strengthen. Against the backdrop of entrenched institutional complexity and bureaucratic inertia, the normalisation of differentiated pathways risks transforming what was historically an exceptional crisis-management mechanism into a structural principle of governance. Ultimately, Draghi’s engagement illustrates a broader crossroads for the Union. Differentiated integration’s long-term implications for cohesion, legitimacy, and collective political identity remain uncertain. Whether such flexibility will eventually strengthen European integration or gradually institutionalise fragmentation remains an open question, one that may prove decisive for the future of European Integration.

About the author

Efthimios Kounalakis holds a Bachelor’s degree in International and European Studies from the University of Piraeus. His academic interests focus on European integration, the externalisation of European policies, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the evolution of European identity. He has been involved in policy-oriented research and institutional work through traineeships at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the House of Representatives of Cyprus, focusing on aspects of EU governance and policy implementation. Efthimios is a Young European Ambassador of the European Commission’s EU Neighbours East programme and has been actively involved in the organisation and implementation of European projects and youth initiatives in Greece and abroad.