By Anita Eugenia Caproni
Migration remains deeply political, as evolving power dynamics bring national interests back to the forefront. Within this framework, the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding between EU and Tunisia reflects a blend of bypassed institutional competencies, the influence of Italy and the Netherlands, and Ursula von der Leyen’s personal ambitions. Tunisia is treated merely as a passive recipient of funds, stripped of political agency and national pride. The new multipolar reality requires a new EU migration diplomacy, in which unity and equality of burden comes as the key pillars.
The MoU and the Politics of Migration Aid
The MoU was initially presented as a flagship success of the EU’s migration diplomacy. The agreement outlined 5 areas of cooperation: agriculture, circular economy, digital transition, air transport, and investment. Although not legally binding, the MoU included substantial financial commitments: €105 million to support Tunisia’s coastguard, €150 million in direct budgetary assistance, and the prospect of up to €900 million in macroeconomic support. In exchange, Tunisia pledged to fight against the smuggling and trafficking of migrants, to readmit its nationals irregularly present in Europe, and to conduct search and rescue operations within its maritime border.
Yet, Tunisia’s compliance soon proved far from straightforward. In September 2023, Tunis denied entry to Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, reportedly in response of their criticism of its human rights’ record. Shortly after, Tunisia returned the first €60 million payment, declaring it would not accept aid that resembled “charity”. Tensions escalated further when then-EU Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi shared a screenshot on X (formerly Twitter), that appeared to show Tunisia requesting the funds. Tunisian authorities countered by claiming the funds were part of a COVID-19 support package that had never been delivered. Although the crisis was eventually resolved and disimbursement resumed, the episode raised serious questions about the credibility of EU migration diplomacy.
Tunisia’s National Interests
Tunisia’s interests in signing the agreement were both urgent and substantial. By 2022, foreign debt had soared to 90% of GDP, and by 2023 the government’s financing needs had reached $7.5 billion. Inflation, averaging around 10% since 2022, drove up the cost of essential goods, with food prices spiking and shortages becoming increasingly common. Against this backdrop, the promise of nearly €1 billion in EU assistance offered the government much-needed liquidity, offering the President short-term breathing space and greater political autonomy.
National pride played a key role in the President’s decision to reject the first “charity” payment. Aware of Tunisia’s bargaining power, the gesture conveyed a dual message. Domestically, it reinforced his image as a leader defending the country from Western interference, while securing external resources Internationally, it signaled shifting power dynamics as the foreign affairs minister stated: “The policy the West were accustomed to before 2011 is no longer permissible and will not pass”. The minister also reaffirmed the country’s unwillingness to assume responsibilities of border management on behalf of the EU, emphasising Tunisia’s national interests and counterbalancing the EU’s disproportionate focus on its own priorities.
Political Agendas Hamper EU Migration Diplomacy
The MoU was spearheaded by European leaders, such as Ursula von der Leyen, Giorgia Meloni, and Mark Rutte, reflecting an unusual alignment between the EU’s migration priorities, member states’ agendas, and the Commission’s broader political strategy. While Rutte sought to bolst domestic support ahead of national elections, the central figures were the Italian Prime Minister and the President of the European Commission.
Since taking office, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has pursued a pragmatic approach to migration. Focusing on strengthening ties Tunis, Italy pledged €155 million to boost economic cooperation and support Tunisia’s migration management capacity. Departing from the EU’s earlier “responsibility-sharing” framework, Meloni has pushed for the externalisation of migration management and the incorporation of the Italian demands in the EU Commission’s Agenda. Her timing proved effective: with the EU elections approaching and negotiations on the stalled EU pact on Migration and Asylum dragging on, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen seized the opportunity to secure Italian support for her prospective second term.
However, this political maneuvre, came at the expense of EU cohesion and credibility. Both the European Parliament and several Member states condemned the Commission’s lack of consultation in concluding the agreement. Ultimately, the Commission was forced to revise its payment procedures in response to internal pressure and international reputation.
Rethinking EU Migration Diplomacy
The 2023 EU–Tunisia MoU demonstrates how migration diplomacy should not be conducted. Building policy around individual member states’ political agendas and institutional short-terminism is a recipe for failure. A different approach is needed, beginning with a coherent and united internal policy. At the same time, the EU can no longer afford to ignore the realities of a multipolar world. African countries expect to be treated as equal partners, with their national interests taken seriously. This requires offering meaningful and predictable economic incentives. If migration is truly a priority, then it must be financed as such.
About the author
Anita Eugenia Caproni worked at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) as a Policy Assistant for Albania and North Macedonia. She holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Exeter.
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