Part III – The impact of Russia’s IW strategies, successes or near misses?
With Kremlin-friendly disinformation and propaganda having woven through local political discourse and permeated formal proxy structures, the final part of this series will offer a brief analysis of the impact that Russia’s IW had on electoral and democratic integrity. Particularly, it will present its success in weakening public trust in institutions, polarising opinion on the benefits of neoliberal governance and eroding confidence in supra-statal organisations such as the EU and NATO.
Moldova
President Maia Sandu’s re-election against former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo saw her secure 55% of the vote – far less than expected. Simultaneously, Moldova held a constitutional referendum to formalise its aspiration for European Union membership. The “yes” vote narrowly succeeded, securing 50.46% of the 1.5 million ballots cast. This meant that the pro-EU campaign won by just over 13,000 votes, narrowly averting a significant setback for Sandu’s pro-Western administration, specifically as pre-referendum polls showed that at least 60% of voters supported the pro-EU path. Unfortunately, the results weakened Sandu’s resilient image ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections, reinforcing narratives about the Moldovan government’s inability to serve national interests. Moreover, rising public discontent, particularly over the cost of utilities, compounded by the Kremlin’s recent decision to cut energy supplies to Transnistria, has placed additional pressure on Sandu’s pro-EU leadership.
Romania
In Romania, Russia’s IW tactics proved more effective than anticipated. As such, the declassified CSAT report highlighted a lack of coordination between SRI, MAI, and the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) in countering the formation of a real-time foreign echo-chamber that bolstered support for Călin Georgescu. Additionally, BEC President Toni Greblă faced widespread accusations of failing to uphold electoral integrity, as he was previously suspected of channelling votes in favour of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), his affiliated political group. With a failure of state institutions to coordinate intelligence capabilities, the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the first presidential vote signalled an acceptable degree of healthy institutional strength. However, the CCR’s decision deepened societal polarisation. The forced re-run further divided society, undermining the anti-system sentiment behind Georgescu’s support, which in February 2025 stood at 38%, while exposing the state’s failure to coordinate intelligence and uphold electoral integrity. At the time of writing, social polarisation has spiked to an all-time high. The development comes after the BEC’s decision, taken on 9 March 2025, to invalidate Georgescu’s candidate application. While the situation is still ongoing, the Bureau’s sentence and the CCR’s later veto against Georgescu’s appeal marked two more institutional interventions in the electoral process, launching Bucharest in chaotic and violent protests. CG’s far-right and populist base –which invokes a deep sense of injustice and adopts a renowned vigilante mentality– attempted to storm the Bureau’s building. The tactics employed during these violent protests –breaking into nearby shops, attacking law enforcement corps, and attempting to enter the Bureau’s building by force– closely mimic those of protesters during a January 6 insurrection.
Following the CCR’s and BEC’s whiplash decisions, the government’s lack of communication concerning the fate of the presidential election, and the role played by state-sponsored actors, Russia’s role in influencing the electoral process could be termed as inconsistent but not inefficient. This combined outcome further entrenched deep popular distrust in the establishment’s capacity to run the country. Herein, Russia’s disinformation campaign managed to deeply divide public opinion, creating severe social polarization. As a result, meaningful civic dialogue is nearly unattainable, and Romanians have little trust in or willingness to cooperate with state institutions to defend democracy from foreign influence. Exploiting the gap between its diaspora, intelligentsia and pro-EU camp, and its older or economically disenfranchised voters, CG’s mythically isolationist campaign has brought about a common and mutual vilification between the two sides of Romanian civic society. While the candidate has been barred from re-running, it is likely that his close ally in parliament, George Simion, head of Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), will represent and unite the sovereigntist front during the upcoming elections. As such, by compelling the CCR’s intervention and exploiting Romania’s lack of operational resolve, in concomitance with worsening societal disenchantment and polarisation, Russia’s IW has managed to destabilise trust in state capacities and their wider regional affiliation. In doing so, the Kremlin aims to isolate Romania from its NATO and EU allies, question its ability to defend itself, and ultimately undermine the alliance’s eastern Black Sea flank.
Conclusion
Both cases classify as narrow misses for Russia’s IW tactics. However, their short-term, partial success sowed the seeds of political instability and anxiety, allowing Russia to leverage the countries’ far-right autocratic powers and play on wavering EU resolve. As such, the 2024 elections exposed deep political polarisation, anti-establishment sentiment, and distrust in EU/NATO institutions. The close vote on Moldova’s constitutional amendment for EU accession and Romania’s Supreme Court intervention in its presidential elections highlight the Kremlin’s ability to sow confusion. The residues of disinformation, spread via proxies and social media, are likely to hinder pro-EU candidates in Moldova’s 2025 elections and Romania’s presidential re-run. While Russia failed to fully sway the vote, it has turned both countries into unstable political environments in the wake of increased regional uncertainty. These developments serve as potential stepping stones for Russia’s broader hybrid warfare strategy, aimed at weakening Western military and destabilising past Soviet republics. By prompting the rise of populist right in the bloc and beyond, Putin aims to erode not only the bloc’s decision-making and technologically coordinated retaliatory capabilities, but also some of its foundational aspects –the potential of its pluralistic collaboration.
About the author
Bella Popescu graduated from the University of Cambridge with a degree in Multi-disciplinary Gender Studies, having previously completed a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at King’s College London, War Studies Department. Her research specialisation combines the study of authoritarian regimes, democratic backsliding, and feminist-oriented public policy.
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