By Bella Cezara Popescu
Called off when the country faced the choice between aligning with its Western allies or risking democratic backsliding into Putin’s sphere of influence, Romania’s ongoing presidential elections have brought about several unprecedented political decisions and candidates. For example, the round held on November 24th (later annulled by the Constitutional Court) has, for the first time since 1989, not delivered a second-round candidate representing either of its two biggest political parties: the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) or the National Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal, PNL). Instead, it delivered Calin Georgesucu (CG), a far-right, pro-Russian, neo-legionary supporter with an obscure and mystical vision that taps into extreme ideas about Romanian culture, ethno-nationalism, folklore, and traditions. Likewise, his opponent, Elena Lasconi, has been the first woman to have stood a real chance of becoming Romania’s president and the first ever opposition candidate to have made it this far.
The Lasconi-Georgescu stand-off was annulled on December 6th by the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR), citing an ongoing aggressive foreign campaign developed with the purpose of meddling in Romania’s national electoral process by taking advantage of social media platforms and algorithms in boosting the popularity of CG. The CCR justified its ruling by pointing to an abuse of AI intended to confuse and manipulate sectors of the population, as well as accusing CG of using obscure foreign funding to support online disinformation narratives. The ruling came as a result of an unprecedented decision taken by President Klaus Iohannis to declassify national security documents of The Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT). The national security forces (Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI), Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE)) found that Georgescu’s campaign (titled Equilibrium and Verticality [Echilibru si Verticalitate]) used farmbots that subjected the electoral process to multiple cybernetics attacks delivered over Telegram and TikTok and sponsored or conducted by Russian-affiliated IPs, a process similar to that seen in Moldovan elections. MAI and SRI declared that the campaign mirrored the “Brother for Brother” initiative developed by Russia in Ukraine, and which is part of the Kremlin’s wider hybrid war against democracies in the region.
Considering the shocking entry of CG and his affiliated political party POT (The Party of Young People [Partidul Oamenilor Tineri]), a succinct candidate portrayal is in order. Firstly, it is important to note Georgescu’s ideological narratives and his link to neo-Nazi, neo-legionary supporters in Romania. CG is a clear proponent of a Ceausescu-era type of national economic and political isolationism, combined with an ethno-nationalist ideology surrounding “foreign enemies” (usually pluralistic minorities) and a proponent of the propagandist version of neutrality towards Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, he has time and again stated his anti-NATO position and repeatedly portrayed EU partnerships as an attempt to “subjugate” national sovereignty. In terms of women rights, CG is a staunch opponent of abortion (citing that if a woman performs a C-section, it counts as a crime against the “divine link with God”). Likewise, he believes that “LGBT propaganda” should be outlawed, and that any queer relationships should not be displayed in public.
Unsurprisingly then, CG does not shy away from questionable appearances, having been seen with his close aid Eugen Sechila, one of the most famous leaders of the legionary movement and under-the-radar neo-Nazi paramilitary camps in Romania. The legionary movement in Romania pays homage to two highly controversial historical figures: Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and Marshal Ion Antonescu, both strong supporters of Hitler and antisemitic, ethno-nationalist fascist figures. Antonescu ran a military dictatorship in Romania, forcing the abdication of the country’s last monarch in 1941, having subsequently dragged Romania into the side of the Axis Powers during WWII.
The Parliamentary Elections, held on December 1st, have delivered another concerning outcome, resulting in an unexpectedly fragile pro-EU coalition. With Alliance for the Union of All Romanians (AUR) (18.1%), S.O.S Party (7.6%) and Party of Young People (POT) (6.2%) the far-right populists and sovereigntists retain a considerable 31.9% of the parliamentary popular vote. While POT is suspected of using the same methods of foreign funding as CG, the combined percentage of AUR-SOS-POT is the biggest far-right majority since Marshal Antonescu’s rise to power. On the other hand, a shaky coalition among parties with conflicting interests and mutual antagonism is struggling to form a government that will keep Romania on its EU and NATO path and send AUR-SOS-POT into opposition. These parties are PSD (22.6%), PNL (14.4%), USR (12.2%) and other minority parties. The coalition is unstable because USR has always been in opposition to PSD, and PSD-PNL have recently finished a rotative that has brought trust in Romanian institutions to an all-time low. Likewise, the PSD-PNL failure is commonly blamed for the populist rise of CG.
Loading, the aftermath
Firstly, it is important to briefly outline how big of a threat a far-right president vs. a far-right governing coaliton are in a semi-presidential republic like Romania. Internally, the President names the prime minister and oversees approving the new government. In this sense, a far-right president can block the formation of a pro-EU coalition, boosting his parliamentary allies in the form of an AUR-SOS-POT alliance. Likewise, the president promulgates all parliamentary bills, retaining the right to return to the Deputy of Chambers and the Senate any law. A far-right president can thus deadlock a pro-EU parliament. Moreover, the president is the Supreme Commando of Romanian Armed Forces and has control over all strategic defence decisions. Lastly, the President can declare a state of national alert, which can be used as an intimidation tactic by an authoritarian incumbent to discourage civic actions and public protests.
In relation to the EU, the president, pursuant to Article 50 of the EU constitution, can trigger a national public referendum for leaving the bloc. However, a “RoExit” decision needs to first pass parliament majority and then have a final popular vote via said referendum. As of now, 70% of the Romanian population would vote to remain in the EU, but with an increasing far-right parliamentary presence, combined with a possible far-right president and considering an all time-low trust in public institutions, this opinion could be swayed in a matter of a few years. Moreover, the veto of the president of a Member State can bloc crucial EU decisions, such as accession of another state (e.g., Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), cuts in carbon emission, and blocking economic sanctions on international actors (e.g., Russia, Iran, etc.).
Similarly, in terms of the country’s NATO membership, the president can play a vital role in the alliance’s strategic defence capability, especially on its Eastern front with Ukraine. Herein, an extremist pro-Putin candidate can refuse collaboration with allies, withdraw from any common NATO mission, delay or block any acquisition of military equipment that aligns with NATO standards, and implement national policies that would strengthen or weaken military and defence preparedness. In short, the Romanian president plays a much more crucial role in terms of the country’s strategic defence and its military alliances than in its politico-economic relation with the EU, which is much more dependent on public consensus and parliamentary majority.
Secondly, CG and his mercenary connections could pose a threat to domestic order. As of Monday December 9th, the police have arrested Horatiu Potra, the chief of the mercenary group protecting CG, for carrying illegal firearms with the aim of potentially instigating civic disorder in Bucharest. The group is suspected by SRI to have prepared an operation of intimidation against pro-EU protests in the capital, with Digi24 sources stating that Potra had a target list of politicians and journalists. Likely, the intimidation campaign of Potra was aimed to instil both violence and fear in pro-EU supporters in order to portray CG’s camp as “peaceful”. Since this date, Potra has been judicially pardoned from the arrest warrant issued by Ploiesti Court of Appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence.
What ought to be considered now is whether this extremely fragile political coalition of PSD-PNL-USR-minorities can efficiently govern. Since its officialisation, there have already been notable disputes surrounding fiscal policy and tackling Romania’s significant public deficit. Specifically, a new Urgency Ordinance has been passed overseeing drastic cuts in public and private gross salaries, higher taxes per private sector, increased public transport fares, cutting state secretary positions by 50%, scrapping student discounts for public facilities, and affecting the second pillar of pension funds. Moreover, the exclusion of USR (past opposition to PSD, now forced to govern together) has created a tense stalemate at the end of December 2024, as USR has been left out of negotiations over distributing important roles in national Ministries. While the group proposed a common candidate, Crin Antonescu, as an opponent to CG, the coalition and its candidate will have to tackle endemic issues in order to regain voters’ trust. Most importantly, they have to address Romanians’ crass socio-economic insufficiencies and bypass the fact that, once more, Crin Antonescu, former leader of PNL, is the face of the past political establishments. Considering the rise in anti-systemic and materially disenfranchised voters, specifically amongst the younger population, it would be too early to proclaim whether the coalition can keep Romania on a pro-EU path.
Moreover, with public mistrust in democratic institutions at a 50% high and with a boiling anti-systemic rage, the annulment of the first round of presidential elections may fuel far-right voters into an even more cohesive alliance. While it remains to be determined whether CG will run again in May 2025 (the first presidential round is scheduled for 4th of May and the second for 11th of May), recent polls showcase that the past frontrunner still retains over 40% popular support. Additionally, in recent protests against the CCR decision, CG supporters have mobilised thousands in favour of overturn the Court’s decision and thus validating CG’s initial vote count. This popular demand is unachievable, as CCR holds supreme authority over the electoral process and its decision cannot be vetoed by any other political or popular organ. However, the scale of mobilisations, the popular far-right and nationalistic discourse and the clear-cut polarisation of Romanian society seen by these elections can form an extremely volatile political environment, both for the weak governing coalition and anti-CG voters. As such, this will not only be a test for the PNL-PSD-UDMR-minorities government, but also for its supporters. Can Romanians shake political apathy, and if so, can the feeling be funnelled towards democratic and liberal co-operation? Or is political disenfranchisement and desperation so high that Romanians may lurch into what they fought so hard against 35 years ago?
About the Author
Bella Cezara Popescu is a recent Master of Research graduate in Gender Studies from the University of Cambridge, having previously completed a BA in International Relations at King’s College London. Her academic expertise applies a historical, gender and foreign policy lens to process of regime change, democratic back-sliding and EU integration in Central Eastern European member states and ‘Russia’s near abroad.
European Studies Review 