The Year of Four Prime Ministers

By Myrto Vamvakoudi

As the Eiffel Tower’s lights sparkled on New Year’s Eve, ushering in 2025, France found itself in a state of political uncertainty unprecedented in its modern history. The nation that prides itself on stability and global influence spent a staggering 130 days without a fully functioning government in 2024, as if rewriting history with its own sardonic twist of “L’Été des quatre rois” (The Summer of Four Kings) of 1830, when monarchs rose and fell faster than the whims of Parisian fashion. In a similar vein, the passing year could be aptly dubbed “L’Année des Quatre Premiers Ministres” (The Year of Four Prime Ministers), unfolding as a dizzying dance of power, with Élisabeth Borne, Gabriel Attal, Michel Barnier, and François Bayrou pirouetting through the corridors of Matignon.

The political crisis in France began after the 2024 snap legislative election organised in June in the wake of a significant setback for the Macronist coalition in the European Parliament elections and the rising electoral success of Marine Le Pen‘s far-right National Rally (RN). Macron’s decision to call for snap elections, widely condemned by the political establishment as an irresponsible manoeuvre, was a multifaceted gambit: he sought to regain a parliamentary majority and to pre-empt the far-right’s growing influence ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Moreover, the French President likely calculated that a short campaign period would disadvantage the opposition, particularly the once-unified but then deeply fractured left, which had been embroiled in internal conflicts during the European elections. He also aimed to strengthen his position for the crucial autumn budget negotiations, fearing that Prime Minister Gabriel Attal’s government might falter before the year’s end without a solid majority, as the 2022 legislative elections had left the Macronist coalition without an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

Nonetheless, this strategy backfired, as the first round of voting on June 30th saw Macron’s party trailing in third place, with the RN leading with its highest-ever electoral score in a national election and the rebuilt leftist alliance, called the New Popular Front (NFP), in second position. Fearing the rise of the far-right wing and leveraging the dynamics of the majority voting system, the outcome of the second round defied expectations and the polls. With record-breaking turnout underscoring intense public engagement, the results marked a seismic shift in France’s political landscape. The NFP emerged victorious with 180 seats, followed closely by Macron’s Ensemble coalition with 168 seats, while RN secured 143 seats. This tripartite division, reflecting the widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo, culminated in a hung parliament. Far from consolidating power and with no bloc securing an outright majority, the new political reality posed serious challenges to effective governance, raising the spectre of political gridlock and demanding intricate coalition-building efforts. Moreover, it propelled France into uncharted territory, as the nation had never experienced a parliament without a dominant party and was accustomed to strong majorities and a bipartisan system since the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

Thereafter, adhering to an “Olympic truce” until mid-August and postponing political negotiations during the Paris 2024 Games, provided only temporary respite from the mounting tensions. The crisis was further exacerbated when Macron refused to appoint Lucie Castets, the NFP’s candidate, as Prime Minister, despite her nomination following weeks of internal negotiations within the leftist coalition and contrary to usual practise, arguing that her selection would likely lead to instability and a vote of no confidence from other parties in the National Assembly. Meanwhile, Gabriel Attal’s government, which had resigned on July 16, continued in a caretaker capacity with restricted power. This political impasse revealed deeper structural tensions: Macron’s resistance to fully embracing the NFP’s electoral victory, the traditional parties’ struggle to adapt to a fragmented political environment, and the growing disconnect between institutional mechanisms and the electorate’s evolving political preferences. 

Two months later, on September 5th, Macron eventually appointed Michel Barnier as Prime Minister, drawing on his extensive experience as a seasoned conservative politician, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator. Macron’s decision was a strategic attempt to stabilise the government by appointing Barnier, as a compromise candidate to unite the fractured remnants of the mainstream right-wing party, Les Républicains (LR), which had split between supporters of aligning with Le Pen’s RN and those steadfastly adhering to the cordon sanitaire strategy to isolate the far-right. Still, Barnier faced immediate opposition from both the NFP and RN, with his administration struggling to navigate a deeply divided National Assembly. Thereupon, his attempts to push through a controversial budget bill using emergency powers under Article 49.3 of the French Constitution – allowing the government to bypass a parliamentary vote – only intensified tensions. In an effort to secure support, Barnier made significant concessions in negotiations with Le Pen’s party, believing they would abstain from voting against him. However, this expectation proved misguided: instead of abstaining, the RN brought down the political guillotine on Barnier, as they joined forces with opposition factions to deliver a historic no-confidence vote against him, marking the first successful such vote since 1962. The result of this was Barnier’s ousting after just 91 days in office – the shortest tenure for a Prime Minister in modern French history. 

After the fall of Barnier’s government, France endured again several days of heightened tension as Macron struggled to find a viable successor. Against this backdrop, the latest to take up residence at Matignon is François Bayrou, known as the “third man” for his pragmatism and centrist stance between left and right in the 2007 presidential race. Appointed on December 13th, Bayrou unveiled his government on December 23rd, consisting of 34 members, including both familiar faces and new appointments: Elisabeth Borne returns as Minister of Education, Jean-Noël Barrot stays as Foreign Affairs Minister, Bruno Retailleau retains his Interior role, and Manuel Valls, former Prime Minister under François Hollande, is appointed Minister for the Overseas. As Bayrou settles into his role, the latest government will aim to achieve the seemingly impossible: bring together a deeply split parliament and stay in office long enough to introduce meaningful change.

Currently, the most immediate challenge for Bayrou’s government is securing approval for the 2025 budget, with the aim of finalising it by mid-February. The new Prime Minister has set an ambitious target of reducing France’s deficit to 5% of GDP, emphasising fiscal responsibility while safeguarding economic growth and advocating for balanced budget measures that protect businesses. Additionally, the new government will need to address key issues such as security, immigration, terrorism, justice, femicides, agriculture, education, and support for France’s overseas territories. Nevertheless, Bayrou’s efforts to forge consensus are off to a shaky start, with RN signalling initial support but warning of potential withdrawal, the LR expressing conditional backing, and the Socialist Party and La France Insoumise (LFI) indicating plans to challenge the government with motions of no confidence.

In parallel, France’s political turmoil has significant implications for the European Union. Especially with Germany also grappling with uncertainty and snap elections set for February 2025 after the collapse of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition, the Franco-German axis – long the engine of European integration – is faltering. This leadership vacuum casts doubt on the EU’s capacity to tackle urgent challenges, including security, climate change, migration policies, and economic reforms. Moreover, the simultaneous crises could also further embolden Eurosceptic forces across Europe, as certain groups may leverage the power gap to advocate for their agendas, potentially undermining EU cohesion and integration efforts. 

Looking ahead, in 2025, France finds itself at a political crossroads, with several potential scenarios shaping its future. One possibility is that Bayrou manages to stabilise the government, secure the majority for the budget, and implement necessary reforms, bringing a sense of balance to the nation. Conversely, if Bayrou fails to build consensus, he could face the same fate as his predecessor, Barnier, leading to the appointment of a new Prime Minister, possibly from the NFP or a technocratic government.

Another scenario involves Macron resigning, as increasing calls from figures like Mathilde Panot (LFI), Charles de Courson (The Centrists), David Lisnard (LR) and others suggest. This would be a significant political move, reminiscent of Charles de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969. Yet, this would not resolve the deadlock in parliament, as Article 12 of the French Constitution prevents a dissolution of the National Assembly until the summer of 2025.

Another worth-mentioning point is that in a more prolonged state of crisis, the political deadlock may compel the nation to consider a potential constitutional reform more seriously. This call, made mostly by LFI representatives, argues that the rigid centralisation in the Fifth Republic, particularly the power imbalance between the President and parliament, has contributed to instability. This is why, according to public law professor Julien Bonnet, this ultra-personalised presidential system is weakening France’s rule of law and democracy. Based on these arguments, a shift toward a Sixth Republic could address these issues by promoting a more deliberative parliamentary system. On the contrary, critics caution that such reforms may not resolve the root problems of political dysfunction and highlight the current Republic’s role in ensuring stability and strong executive leadership in comparison to earlier systems.

The most likely outcome, however, is that new parliamentary elections will be called sometime between the summer and the end of 2025. While Macron has firmly opposed this option and reiterated his intention to finish his term in 2027, it remains potentially the most credible path forward to address the political impasse. Additionally, following Macron’s New Year’s Eve address and his acknowledgement that the dissolution of the National Assembly worsened political instability, a more direct, participatory approach seems likely to emerge. Although the President did not explicitly mention referendums, he emphasised the need for the French public to weigh in on key decisions, signalling a shift toward involving citizens more actively in addressing France’s political deadlock. 

While only time will reveal which developments will ultimately influence France’s political trajectory in the coming year, all eyes are now on François Bayrou and his fledgling government as they prepare for their first Council of Ministers meeting and subsequent actions. Can they break the cycle of instability and chart a new course for the nation? Or will 2025 bring yet another round of political musical chairs?

About the Author

Myrto holds a Dual Master’s Degree in International Security and EU/International Relations from Sciences Po Paris and Freie Universität Berlin. She has gained extensive experience in European policies through internships across EU institutions (European Commission), government, diplomatic realms, academia, and NGOs in multiple countries. Myrto is fluent in English, French, German, and Greek.